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THE RIGHT TO LIFE OR THE RIGHT TO  
COMPENSATION UPON DEATH:
PERSPECTIVES ON AN INCLUSIVE UNDERSTANDING 




This paper discusses the right to life in its most inclusive sense. It argues that the right to life cannot be seen only in the light of the deprivation 
of life, but more importantly, in the light of the sustenance of life. Accord-
ingly, that the right to life should be broadly interpreted to encompass all 
its components and that some of its important components are contained in 
the non-justiciable provisions of our Constitution. The paper further argues 
that by assimilating the provisions which the Constitution declares non-jus-
ticiable with the right to life, such provisions become justiciable without 
disturbing the their otherwise non-justiciable character since they are not 
enforced on their own force but on the force of the justiciable right to life 
provisions of the Constitution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 33(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN), 
1999, provides that “every person has a right to life, and no one shall be de-
prived intentionally of his life, save in execution of the sentence of a court in 
respect of a criminal offence of which he has been found guilty in Nigeria”. 
From this provision, two core elements could be extracted: “every person 
has a right to life” and “no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life”. 
These two elements open unto variety of instances of actions that may prop-
erly fall within the section, if it is realised that the elements yield to both 
conjunctive and disjunctive interpretation and application. 
When read conjunctively, there is the danger of the latter element over-
shadowing the former and thus yielding to an understanding that the right 
to life is violated only when there has been an arbitrary deprivation of life. 
In consequence the full realisation of the ‘right to life’ which is actually the 
subject-matter of the provision is conditioned by the understanding that the 
remedies of the section arise only within the incident of unlawful deprivation 
of life.1 This is more so, as “unintentional” deprivation of life arising from 
acts or omissions which have the potential to cause death may outweigh what 
may properly be termed “intentional deprivation of death”. On the other 
hand, a realisation, that the clause “every person has a right to life” can 
stand by itself and sustain a cause of action even before death occurs, gives 
an inclusive understanding that enables the provision to protect life as well as 
provide remedies for the arbitrary deprivation of life. The right to life would 
be meaningless, if it is only relevant to a life that has been deprived. 
Agreeably, the various rights that are here canvassed as part of the right 
to life are also provided for as separate rights in most human rights and con-
stitution instruments, including the CFRN. The problem, however, as also 
exemplified in the CFRN, is that the autonomous application of the rights 
is inhibited by the fact that they are usually made to exist as non-justiciable 
provisions in constitutional texts. This, indeed, has made the inclusive inter-
pretation of the right to life inevitable. For instance, a government may rely 
on the fact that an important right, as the right to a healthy environment 
(which is sine qua non to the sustenance of life), is not justiciable at the suit 
of a dying population who just wants their life preserved by safeguarding the 
environment from pollution occasioned by economic activities. An inclusive 
1 This is what the writer shall refer to as the traditional approach to the right to life through-
out this article. 
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understanding thus makes the safeguards of the right to life more certain 
and effective as well as emphasises, not only the right not to be killed, but 
also the right to be rescued from impending death.     
In essence, this paper argues that Section 33 of the CFRN imposes a posi-
tive duty on the government to provide safe and good infrastructure that guar-
antees a dignified life to the citizenry. It argues that the judicial understanding 
of the constitutional text of the right to life in Nigeria has so far emphasised 
“the intentional deprivation of life” over the protection of life itself. The paper 
urges Nigeria courts to move away from this traditional approach and adopt 
a broader understanding of the right to life that affords an implementation of 
all the components of the right to life which have so far been obscured in the 
non-justiciable provisions of the Constitution. Importantly, it notes that the 
inclusive interpretation of text of section 33 is beginning to take root in lower 
courts and thus encourages the Supreme Court to place its imprimatur on this 
trend when the opportunity presents itself. In making the argument, the article 
highlights the progress made by courts in other jurisdictions having similar 
constitutional dichotomy between justiciable and non-justiciable rights.
The paper is divided into nine parts. Part one is the introduction; part 
two discusses what the writer referred to as the traditional view of the right to 
life; part three discusses the inclusive perspective to the right to life; part four 
discusses the essence of the inclusive application of the right to life; part five 
discusses the text of section 33 of the CFRN; part six discusses the narrow ju-
dicial application of the right in Nigeria; part seven argues for the adoption of 
the inclusive application of the right to life in Nigeria; part eight discusses the 
interface between the inclusive application of section and the non-justiciable 
provisions of the constitution; and part nine concludes the paper.
2. THE RIGHT TO LIFE
The content of the right to life cannot be pinned to one easily delin-eated sphere; it encompasses a wide variety of other rights which are 
dependent on the existence of life for their enjoyment; it is the nucleus of 
all other rights. The traditional approach to the right to life views the right 
in a very parochial sense to cover only occasions where the government 
was directly involved in the arbitrary deprivation of life. As a corollary, the 
government is not liable for a breach of the right to life for death caused by 
the failure of the government to protect life. This approach equates the right 
with the right to compensation for unlawful deprivation of life. Following 
this approach, the right to life becomes actionable in court only upon the 
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occurrence of death. In other words, litigants cannot go to court to enforce 
the right to life while they are still alive. This is the category of Nasiru 
Bello v. AG Oyo State.2 In this case, a convicted felon was executed by the 
respondent while his appeal to a higher court was pending. At the suit of 
the deceased family, the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the respondent 
violated the deceased right to life and ordered compensation to his family. 
This could also be exemplified by the finding of the African Commission for 
Human and Peoples’ Rights in Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture 
and Association Internationale des juristes Democrates) Commission Inter-
nationale des Juristes (C.I.J) Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme/
Rwanda, where the Commission found that the massacre of a large number 
of Rwandan villagers by the Rwandan Armed Forces and the many report-
ed extra judicial executions for reasons of their membership of a particular 
ethnic group were series of violations of the right to life in article 4 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.3 
In many ways, there has been a movement away from this traditional 
approach to a more liberal and expansive approach that does not consider 
the breach of the right in terms of the occurrence of death. A few cases 
would explain this. In Makaratzis v. Greece,4 the European Court of Hu-
man Rights held that the use of a potentially lethal force against the appli-
cant by the police was a violation of his right to life, notwithstanding that 
he survived the injuries, for which the Greek government was liable. Also, 
in World Organisation Against Torture, Lawyers’ Committee for Human 
Rights, Jehovah Witnesses, Inter-African Union for Human Rights /Zaire,5 
the African Commission on Human Rights declared that arbitrary arrests, 
detention and torture were a violation of the right to life in article 4 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.6 It has even been held that 
the Turkish government was in breach of the right to life of the deceased 
for failure to effectively investigate the cause of death. 7    
The traditional approach, which is indubitably correctly applied in Ni-
geria, views the right to life as imposing only a negative duty on the State 
not to arbitrarily deprive a citizen of her life. This is in contradistinction to 
an inclusive application of the right to life, which combines the traditional 
view with the enforcement of the right in terms of the imposition of a posi-
2 [1986] 5 NWLR (pt. 45) 828
3 Communication 27/89, 46/91, 49/91,99/93
4 Application No. 50385/99
5 Communication 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93
6 Ibid, para 43
7 Tanrikulu v. Turkey, Application No. 23763/94 of July 8, 1999
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tive duty on the government to take all reasonable steps to protect life. Fol-
lowing the inclusive understanding of the right, the Inter-American Court 
of Human rights, in Juvenile Re-education Institute case, declared that “[t]
he right to life and the right to humane treatment require not only that the 
State respect them (negative obligation) but also that the State adopts all 
appropriate measures to protect and preserve them (positive obligation)”.8 
A major problem with the traditional approach is that it has the ef-
fect of excluding such other components (such as the right to health, food, 
healthy environment, etc) contained in the bundle conveniently wrapped up 
as the right to life. This has the effect of restricting the enforcement of the 
right to the occurrence of death and thus confining the right to the realm of 
a broken promise, for which compensation is a just and adequate remedy 
only when the government directly authorised the death. The right would 
mean nothing more than the right to compensation for unlawful death rath-
er than a right that protects life from unlawful deprivation.
3. IS THE RIGHT TO LIFE IMPLIED IN OTHER RIGHTS?
To avoid this parochial view, courts in some jurisdictions do not view the right to life in isolation. While not abandoning its negative connota-
tion, should death occur, the courts lean heavily on the positive components 
of the right by reading it along with the positive duties of the State, often de-
clared non-justiciable in constitutional texts. Examples of such positive du-
ties are contained in Chapter II of the CFRN, covering such components of 
the right to life as food, shelter, healthcare, healthy environment, etc. These 
provisions, being non-justiciable by virtue of section 6(6)(c) of the CFRN, 
are not enforceable on their own force. What courts in some jurisdictions 
have done is to enforce those essential components, not as autonomous con-
stitutional provisions but as in-excludable components of the right to life. 
Some of the components of the right to life which courts in some juris-
dictions interpret and apply as rights imposing a positive duty on the State 
to protect a dignified life are highlighted below.
(a) Positive Duty to Provide Conditions that Guarantee Dignified Life 
What this means is that the right to life is not just a bare negative duty on 
the State not to arbitrarily take life; it emphasises that the right to life, has 
at its core, the positive duty on the State to create the essentials that would 
8 Judgment of September 2, 2004. Series C. No. 112, para 158
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allow for a dignified life. The government would be in breach of the right to 
life, therefore, if it does not channel the commonwealth towards the com-
mon good by pursuing policies and programs towards a society that guar-
antees the basic necessities of life to the people. In the Street Children case,9 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, declared: 
The right to life is a fundamental human right, and the exercise of 
this right is essential for the exercise of all other human rights. If 
it is not respected, all rights lack meaning .... In essence, the fun-
damental right to life includes, not only the right of every human 
being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that 
he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that 
guarantee a dignified existence. States have the obligation to guar-
antee the creation of the conditions required in order that violations 
of this basic right do not occur. 
Accordingly: 
States must adopt any measures that may be necessary to create an 
adequate statutory framework to discourage any threat to the right to 
life; to establish an effective system of administration of justice able to 
investigate, punish and repair any deprivation of lives by state agents, 
or by individuals; and to protect the right of not being prevented from 
access to conditions that may guarantee a decent life, which entails the 
adoption of positive measures to prevent the breach of such right.10 
 
(b) Right to Healthcare
The right to healthcare is in itself quite encompassing; it covers everything that 
would adversely affect health when deprived, and thus, ultimately threatens 
life. It covers safe drinking water; healthy environment; medical care, among 
9 Villagran-Morales et al v. Guatamela, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 63, 144 (Nov. 
19, 1999). Applauding the approach of the Court, Steven R. Keener & Javier Vasquez, ‘A 
Life Worth Living: Enforcement of the Right to Health Through the Right to Life in the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (2008-2009) 40 Colum. Hum. Rts Rev, 595, 597, 
opined that “the court took the idea that the right to life must be a right to a dignified life 
and began to enforce many elements of the right to health, finding violations even when the 
victims did not die and requiring government provision of food, water, sanitation, medicine 
and adequate medical care”.)
10 The Indigenous Community of Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Series C No. 146 [2006] IA-
CHR 2, para 153.
11 [1986] 4 SCC 37
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others. In Paschim Banag Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal,11 the Indian 
Supreme Court held that the right to emergency medical care was enforceable 
as a right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The court rea-
soned that the right to emergency medical care formed a core component of 
the right to health which in turn was recognised as forming an integral part of 
the right to life. Article 21 provides: “no person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”.
This component of the right to life imposes a positive duty on the govern-
ment to channel its policies towards the provision of adequate and affordable 
healthcare as well as a duty to eliminate situations that are adverse to good 
health. How can it be said that the right of a people to life is protected by the 
government when the people are so isolated, geographically or financially, from 
medical services; safe drinking water; security of lives and properties, etc.?
(c) Right to Livelihood 
The Indian Supreme Court has also defined the right to life to include the 
right to livelihood.12  In Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka,13 the court was 
asked to determine the constitutionality of a capitation fee imposed on those 
who wished to gain admission into a medical school. The fee had the effect of 
placing the school beyond the reach of the poor. The court relied on the right 
to life in article 21 of the Constitution of that country to declare the fee un-
constitutional. The court used the opportunity to make a definite statement 
on some of the necessities that are implied in the right to life. It declared: 
We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human 
dignity and all that goes along with it, namely the bare necessaries 
of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities 
for reading, writing and expressing oneself.  
The same reasoning was employed by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in the Indigenous Community of Yakye Axa v. Paraguay,14 
where the court held that the prevention of access to the applicant’s tradi-
tional means of livelihood was a violation of the right to life under article 4 
12 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipality Corporation [1985] 2 Supp SCR 51. Here, the court 
declared that it was a breach of article 21 to evict pavement and slum dwellers from Bom-
bay city. In ASK v. Government of Bangladesh, Writ No. 3034 1999, the right to life was 
held to include the right not to be deprived of livelihood and shelter.  
13 1992) AIR 185       
14 Series C No. 125, [2005] IACHR 6, 
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of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. The article provides 
that “every person has the right to have his life respected”. Indeed, the rea-
soning of the same court in the Street Children case,15 that access to the con-
ditions that guarantee dignified existence is part of the right to life, should 
particularly be seen in the light of access to means of livelihood.
(d) Right to Education    
In Unni Krishnan, J.P., v. State of A.P. and Others,16 the Supreme Court of 
India was seised with the determination of the nature of rights contained in 
the non-justiciable article 45 of the Constitution of that country. The article 
provides that “the State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten 
years from the commencement of this Constitution, free and compulsory 
education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years”. The 
court held that the passage of 44 years since the enactment of the Constitu-
tion had effectively converted the non-justiciable right to education of chil-
dren under 14 into an enforceable right. The court further held that the right 
to education is implied in, and fundamental to the enjoyment of the right to 
life in article 21 of the Indian Constitution, 1950. Accordingly, it was de-
clared that a citizen has a right to call upon the State to provide educational 
facilities to him within the limits of its economic capacity and development.
The real connection between the right to life and education becomes 
obvious when viewed in the light of the fact that an uneducated individual, 
who lacks the expertise to gain employment to sustain his livelihood, will 
not only be left with a debased self-esteem, she would also be banished to 
an inferior societal standing. This would, no doubt, injure his right to life; 
right to own property; right to associate with others in society; right to air 
his opinion in public, etc. 
Therefore, the right to education is arguably not confined to classroom 
education alone, but it extends to all informal technical and other training 
that enable individuals acquire the needed skills for their economic good.  
(e) Right to Healthy Environment
Courts in other jurisdictions have also shown that the right to healthy envi-
ronment is integrated in the right to life. Indeed, the importance of a good 
and productive environment to the sustenance of the life and wellbeing of 
15 (n 9), para 144
16 [1993] 4 Law Reports of the Commonwealth, February 4, 1993.
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individuals cannot be gainsaid. In addition to the general health implica-
tions of an unhealthy environment, there is the larger impact on individuals 
in a community that relies on its immediate environment (say, for fishing 
or farming) to generate a livelihood. This also has a larger negative impact 
on the commonwealth, as a poor environment limits the ability of a nation 
to feed itself. It does also impact on the depletion of the rural communities 
arising from the need to seek other means of sustenance. This alone is a rec-
ipe for crimes and the further distortion of the already overcrowded urban 
environment, which singularly or cumulatively diminishes the life-span of 
citizens – a contaminated and an unhealthy environment definitely has a 
direct effect on life expectancy. 
In realization of the importance of the available of the means of sus-
taining life to the right to life, it was held in the Indian case of M.C.Me-
hta v. Union of India,17 that the denial of the means of sustaining life is 
tantamount to a denial of the right to life. In categorical terms, the court 
held that the right to life includes the right to live in a clean and harmless 
environment. Similarly, in Shela Zia v. Water and Power Development Au-
thority (WAPDA),18 the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled that the right to 
life included a right to live in a clean environment. 
The decisions of the courts in the above cases were largely anchored on 
the fact that socio-economic and environmental rights do not only ensure 
the attainment of an adequate standard of living for the people, they also 
help to guarantee certain conditions that are fundamental to human exis-
tence, without which “fundamental rights” will have no meaning. It does 
follow that the intricate relationship between the right to a healthy environ-
ment and the right to life cannot be obliterated by reducing the right to a 
healthy environment to the level of non-justiciability. 
4. THE ESSENCE OF THE INCLUSIVE  
CONSTRUCTION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE
What the courts have done in the jurisdictions mentioned above is to situate the right to life within its proper context of the prevention of 
wasteful deaths, thereby giving it a more purposive definition and applica-
tion than its mere confinement to compensation after death had occurred 
– a clear case of medicine after death. Seen in this sense, the right to life 
17 [1987] All Indian Reports (AIR) 1086
18 [1994] PLD.A16
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imposes a positive duty on the government to prevent a state of affairs that 
easily lends itself to deprivation of life. This point was aptly made by the In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights in Velásquez-Rodíguez v. Honduras, 
where it affirmed that the right to life implies an obligation on the part of 
State Parties to take reasonable steps to prevent situations that could result 
in the violation of that right.19 
It should be stated, however, that the components of the right to life are 
not limited to those mentioned above. The list is actually open-ended, as a 
cause which is ordinarily not actionable within the precinct of the right to 
life, can become so actionable, if in the circumstances of a particular case, 
it poses a threat to the life and well-being of the litigant. The core element 
in this robust approach is the attainment of a dignified life for the individ-
ual. Again, this point has been variously emphasised by the Inter American 
Court of Human Rights. In the Yakye Axa case, the court reasoned:
Essentially, this right [to life] includes not only the right of every hu-
man being not to be arbitrarily deprived of his life, but also the right 
that conditions that impede or obstruct access to a decent existence 
should not be generated. One of the obligations that the State must 
inescapably undertake as guarantor, to protect and ensure the right 
to life, is that of generating minimum living conditions that are com-
patible with the dignity of the human person and of not creating 
conditions that hinder or impede it. In this regard, the State has the 
duty to take positive, concrete measures geared toward fulfilment of 
the right to a decent life, especially in the case of persons who are 
vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a high priority.20  
From this reasoning of the Court, it could be gleaned that the causes 
that are enforceable as components of the right to life are broader in relation 
to persons who are vulnerable and at higher risk than people who do not 
fall into this category.  
The importance of this approach lays in the use of the right to life to 
prevent wasteful deaths by compelling the government to take proactive 
steps against deaths occurring, not only from its commission, but also from 
its errors and omissions. When a government sat back and watched while 
its citizen’s life are theatrically and persistently taken away by avoidable 
19 Judgment of July29 1988 Para 188
20 (n 14), p. 161-162
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deaths: whether from road accidents arising from bad roads or poorly reg-
ulated driving standards; or deaths resulting from the barrel of armed rob-
bers’ guns; or those of politicians’ dogs of intimidation and assassination; or 
from extremists’ bombs, the resultant deaths cannot be completely separat-
ed from the failure of the government in its obligations to take positive steps 
to prevent situations that could result in the violation of the right to life. The 
more the failure of government in these regards, the more impunity those 
directly responsible for the state of affairs enjoy and the more they prosper 
in the execution of their evil machinations. These are the first pieces of evi-
dence to assess, while measuring the level of compliance of government with 
its obligation to guarantee the right to life, as these life-wasting catalysts are 
the first evidence of the breach of the right to life even before death results. 
This is so much so that even when government has been shown to have 
taken the requisite steps, the European Court of Human Rights has said that 
government is yet under an obligation to effectively investigate the cause of 
death in every individual case. This, perhaps, is not just for the purpose of 
punishing the perpetrators but for the more important reason of ensuring 
the perpetrators do not have the opportunity of prospering in their evil en-
terprises and also to prevent a reoccurrence of death arising from wanton 
disregard to public health safety. This ultimately protects the life of the im-
mediate or remote victims of the perpetrators.  
5. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
As earlier mentioned, the key elements of the full text of section 33 of the CFRN are, “every person has a right to life” and “no one shall be 
deprived intentionally of his life”. All the other parts of the provision deal 
with instances, where the right to life may be derogated from. The section 
did not attempt to define the content of the right to life and, therefore, not 
exhaustive. This is understandable; no constitutional document is expected 
to cover minute details of possible eventualities. It is for the judiciary to give 
life and flesh to the bare letters of the law in a manner that advances the 
intent of the law-giver and best effectuates the law. The fact that the CFRN 
did not define the right to life in section 33 in the light of its various com-
ponents discussed above, does not exclude them from the purview of the 
constitutional text of the right to life, neither does their inclusion in Chapter 
II of the Constitution make the right to life and its Chapter II components 
mutually exclusive.
In this wise, courts in some jurisdictions have shown themselves a wise 
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harbinger for the Nigeria Supreme Court in the manner the courts in those oth-
er jurisdictions have inclusively used the bare minimum right to life guaranteed 
in their respective Constitutions to highlight the implicit content of the right to 
life. As shown above, the courts have achieved this by expansively interpreting 
the right to include its implicit aspects which are commonly confined to realm 
of unenforceable social and economic rights in many constitutions.
6. THE JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDING IN NIGERIA
Aside isolated High Court cases, such as Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petro-leum Development Corporation of Nigeria Limited (Shell & Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 21 the Nigerian case law on this 
point is yet to grasp the progress already made by both municipal and in-
ternational courts in the realistic application of the right to life. The paro-
chial understanding of the right to life appears still to be controlling in the 
conception and reasoning of the Supreme Court and of policy makers in 
Nigeria. This partly explains why the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
life is hardly litigated before Nigerian courts. Hence, the view of this writer 
that the right to life is yet to be taken beyond the traditional understanding 
as applied in Nasiru Bello v. AG Oyo State.22 
In Jonah Gbemre v. Shell, the plaintiff sued Shell Nigeria, NNPC and the 
Attorney General of the Federation, seeking a declaration that the rights to life 
and dignity of human person contained in sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Con-
stitution included the right to clean, poison-free, pollution-free and healthy 
environment. The Federal High Court declared that the actions of the 1st and 
2nd respondents in continuing to flare gas in the course of their oil exploration 
and production activities in the applicant’s community was in violation of the 
fundamental right to life (including healthy environment) and dignity of hu-
man persons guaranteed by the Constitution and the African Charter.    
7. TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE APPLICATION OF THE 
RIGHT TO LIFE IN NIGERIA
The danger in the prevailing approach in Nigeria is that it practically renders the right to life meaningless by allowing events that denigrate 
21 Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05/FHC, 14 November, 2005 cited in J.N. Aduba, ‘The Right to Life 
under Nigeria Constitution: the Law, the Courts and Reality’, (Lagos: Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies, 2011) p. 6.
22 (n 2)
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the right to continue and thereby overwhelm the right to life. In its true 
sense, the right to life encompasses everything that has the immediate or 
remote ability to cause death. It covers pollution of air, water and anything 
that generally affects well-being, including the lack of provision of adequate 
healthcare. It covers failure to provide adequate security; it covers the de-
struction of a person’s means of livelihood and thus making it impossible 
for the person to afford the basic necessities of life. The list is endless; it goes 
way beyond compensation for unlawful deprivation of life to cover every-
thing that negatively impacts on a dignified life. 
In other words, such other rights as right to privacy, fair hearing, reli-
gion, dignity (to mention a few), appertain to individuals as living beings, 
and as rights which are fundamental to the enjoyment and preservation of 
life. These rights are not ends in themselves, their fundamental nature lies in 
their ultimate aim of ensuring a healthy and dignified life: they form part of 
the package wrapped up in the right to life. Indeed, “when the right to life 
is not respected, all the other rights disappear, because the person entitled to 
them ceases to exist”.23 Rightly put:
the right to life presupposes the existence and availability to all of 
certain basic facilities such as food, health, shelter and education. 
The right to life to be maintained needs food which has to be pro-
duced by members of the society all of whom have this right to life. 
Thus the right to life is linked to the right to work in order to obtain 
means of subsistence to procure food and shelter…24
The connection of the right to life to adequate security and lack of ba-
sic infrastructure is most obvious to those who have to live with the fear 
that their lives may be wantonly deprived by forces around them due to 
the failure of government to tackle the challenges. The government is by 
no means entitled to sit back while the governed are constantly deprived 
of their lives and means of livelihood as a result of lack of good infra-
structure and adequate security of lives and property. This becomes very 
worrisome when confronted with the fact that thousands of Nigerians die 
from road accidents and attacks by criminals: deaths that would, perhaps, 
have been avoided if government was truly alive to its responsibilities. It 
23 Yakye Axa, (n 14), para 161; Juvenile Re-education Institute, (n 9), para 156
24 S. Uchegbu, ‘The Concept of the Right to Life under Nigerian Constitution’, in Essays in 
Honour of T.O. Elias, 151-152 cited in J.N. Aduba, (n 21), p. 3. 
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is on record that a total of 7, 850 lives were lost to auto crash and 27,000 
sustained injuries between January 2010 and October 2010, alone.25 This 
was barely a year after the Senate Committee on Road Contracts reported 
that over Three Hundred Billion Naira was misappropriated from road 
contracts between 1999 and 2003.26 Only recently, the aviation industry 
was enmeshed in massive corruption scandal as a time that planes were 
falling from the sky, destroying lives and properties of Nigerians. This is 
not to mention the number of Nigerians that have died from bombs and 
small weapons within the last one year,27 even as the country continues to 
bend under the massive weight of security budget and security votes. In 
analysing the road accident statistics released in 2011 by the Federal Road 
Safety Commission (FRSC), a newspaper reported as follows:
According to the Corps Marshall and Chief Executive of the FRSC, 
Mr. Osita Chidoka, in the four months (December 2009-March, 
2010), 7, 737 road accidents were recorded in the country. This 
resulted in the death of 1,056 persons… if interpreted, it means 
264 people die monthly on our roads.... These figures are alarming, 
considering the fact that the actual figure may be higher that what 
has been given by the FRSC…. The grim statistics mirror the global 
death toll on Nigerian roads which is conservatively and currently 
put at 1.2 million annually. According to the Road Safety, the caus-
es of accidents include bad roads … and non adherence to road 
safety rules and regulations.28 
  
When viewed in this light, one begins to see the inextricable connection be-
tween the right to life and the failure to provide basic infrastructure that would 
reduce mortality rate. This would in turn justify the interpretation of the right to 
life, not only in the light of the imposition of a negative duty but also as a right 
that imposes a positive duty on the government to provide the basic conditions 
essential to the quest of Nigerians for a meaningful and dignified life. This is and 
should be made the focus of the judicial understanding of section 33. 
25 See Vanguard Newspaper of November 18, 2010, quoting Save Accident Victims of Nigeria 
(SAVAN). SAVAN even stated that the figure may be higher as not all accidents were reported. 
26 See the Guardian Newspaper of October 7 and 12 2009.
27 In a recent report, the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshall Oluseyi Petirin, admitted 
that “boko haram has killed over 1,200 people in Nigeria” – the Vanguard Newspaper, 
March 11, 2012.
28 National Accord Newspaper (online) http://www.nationalaccordnewspaper.com> (accessed 
March, 25, 2012)  
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Indeed, no one disputes the sad fact that the mismanagement of the vast 
resources of Nigeria by successive governments has negatively impacted on 
the life expectancy of the Nigerian people. The negative impact of bad gov-
ernance is a telling reason why section 33 CFRN can no longer be restric-
tively interpreted. A government that allowed a whopping Three Hundred 
Billion Naira to be misappropriated from road contracts (this is just at the 
federal level, to the exclusion of figures from the states of the Federation) 
without a single prosecution, has every reason to be liable for causing the 
death of the people who have died from avoidable accidents resulting from 
the bad state of the roads for which the money was budgeted. In any event, 
it is the government that allowed the funds allocated for fixing the roads to 
be misappropriated; it is government that must take responsibility. 
The sad commentary on the wanton neglect of Nigerian roads, and 
the link between budgetary allocations and corruption could also be seen 
in other areas of our national life. The basic infrastructure crisis Nigeria 
presently faces has arguably created the environment for avoidable deaths 
to thrive: those who escaped road accidents are likely to be deprived of their 
lives by police brutality; or the guns of armed robbers or political assassins, 
kidnappers, or religious extremists groups; those who escaped the guns may 
be caught up by a bomb or by starvation, if not by employment stampede. 
Need we even mention lack of adequate medical care and sanitation? On the 
whole, it is the duty of the Nigerian government to explain how the position 
of Nigeria as number 181 on the life expectance table with a life expectancy 
of 50.26 years for its citizens,29 correlates with the constitutionally guaran-
teed right to life. By this ranking, life expectancy in Nigeria is higher than 
that of only 17 out of the 198 countries assessed by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs. This is even so as Nigeria is a 
large producer of crude oil.
When these naked truths are brought into the constitutional perspective 
of the right to life, it would be clear that it is incumbent on Nigerian lawyers 
and courts to begin to use the constitutionally guaranteed right to life to 
demand good governance which is the direct product of the enforcement of 
the various components of the right to life discussed above. By so doing, the 
right to life becomes the veritable tool for holding government to account 
and making them responsive to the protection of the life of their citizens by 
tackling the myriads of life-depriving problems currently prowling the nation. 
29 United Nations World Population Prospects: 2012 Revision
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8. THE IMPLICATION OF SECTION 6(6)(C)  
ON AN INCLUSIVE APPLICATION OF  
THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN NIGERIA
It is important to stress here that this paper is not advocating that the con-stitutional provisions precluding the enforcement of Chapter II be ignored 
by Nigerian courts. The point being made here, and which is clear from the 
inclusive application of the right to life, is that most of the socio-economic 
rights contained in Chapter II cannot be neatly sieved away from the right 
to life. This is particularly in view of the lessons from other jurisdictions, 
which show that some of the non-justiciable rights in Chapter II are more 
inclusive to the right to life than they are exclusive thereto. The intricate 
connection of some items in Chapter II to the right to life in section 33 is ob-
vious from the following Chapter II provisions: section 14(2)(a): “the secu-
rity and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”; 
section 15(3)(a): it is the duty of government to “provide adequate facilities 
for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services throughout 
the Federation”; section16(1)(b), it is the duty of government to “control 
the national economy in such manner as to secure the maximum welfare, 
freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and 
equality of status and opportunity”. 
Some may opine that the court is not best suited to adjudicate matters 
contained in Chapter II. Such arguments are based on the assumption that 
since Nigeria operates a system of separation of powers which places the 
power to allocate resources within the sphere of executive and legislative 
prerogatives; the use of socio-economic rights to enforce a positive duty on 
the political organs of government to allocate resources to certain areas – 
say education – is a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. There 
is also the argument that the problem becomes particularly complex when 
the judgment carries budgetary implications.30 Accordingly, the following 
questions are often asked: In relation to available resources in a certain fis-
cal year, what is an appropriate percentage of the government’s budget that 
has been spent on housing, education, and so forth? Put in another way, 
considering only available resources, is the state doing its best to address the 
issue of adequate housing [good roads, security, health, education] within 
such resources? That is a difficult question. How can judges decide this? 
30 John Cantius Mubangizi, ‘The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights in Se-
lected African Countries: A Comparative Evaluation’, (2006) 2 Afr J. Legal Stud 1, 4 
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First of all, we do not know much about this, and secondly, this amounts to 
great intervention on the work of parliament and the executive. The elected 
representatives not judges must decide between health, education…when 
allocating resources31
In a similar vein, it has been admitted even by the progressive Indian 
Supreme Court that:
No State or country can have unlimited resources to spend on any 
of its projects. That is why it only approves its projects to the extent 
it is feasible. The same holds good for providing medical facilities to 
its citizens including its employees. Provision for facilities cannot be 
unlimited. It has to be to the extent finances permit. 32
This paper agrees with the views of the learned Indian court. As such, 
what is being advocated here is not an autonomous application of the Chap-
ter II provisions, rather what is being advocated is the purposive application 
of the right to life to reflect its full components duplicated in Chapter II. 
What Nigerian courts are being urged to do is to enforce the right to basic 
infrastructure (the absence of which has been responsible for the avoidable 
death of Nigerians) as part of the right to life, without recourse to Chapter 
II. By so doing, the courts would simply avoid the non-justiciable charac-
ter of Chapter II without actually violating the constitutional stipulation of 
non-justiciability in section 6(6)(c).    
That said, it is pertinent to emphasise that the question is more intricate 
than the mere availability of resources; it implicates the more complex process 
of the effective allocation of available resources and accountability. The argu-
ment of lack of resources to fix strategic Nigerian roads, for instance, can hard-
ly hold water in a country where Three Hundred Billion Naira road budgetary 
allocation was misappropriated within 10 years. It is all the more ridiculous 
and highly insensitive to general public good for a government that is not ac-
countable in the use of the resources at its disposal to plead scant resources in 
order to excuse itself from providing basic necessities that guarantee a dignified 
life for its citizens. It has been argued along this line, and rightly too, that:
31 Albie Sachs, ‘Enforcement of Social Economic Rights’ (2006-2007) 22 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 
673, 678 
32 Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of Indian, 3 SCC 42 (1995). Also see 
Mubangizi , (n 30), p. 3.
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In order for a State Party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at 
least its minimum core [human rights] obligations to a lack of available 
resources, it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of 
priority, those minimum obligations.33
Can the Nigerian government really plead lack of available resources for 
the massive failure of life sustaining infrastructure? Is it not obvious to Nige-
rians and the world at large that the present state of affairs is the direct prod-
uct of corruption and mismanagement of public funds? By this ill-conceived 
distinction, the government is excused from being held accountable by the 
ordinary process of the law for failing to provide such basic life sustaining 
essentials as security and good roads, yet the government, like Oliver Twist, 
sits on the vast resources of the nation and milks the citizens dry through the 
burden of corruption and taxation. But when a citizen goes to court to de-
mand a meaningful and happy life through the provisions of basic amenities, 
the same government pleads non-justiciability because what the citizen seeks 
(which is ordinarily within the province of the right to life) has been specifical-
ly mentioned in Chapter II. This should not be; logic and common sense show 
that the right in section 33 of the Constitution is fundamental to the individual 
who is alive, and not the dead. Otherwise it is no right at all. 
To continue to maintain that the right to life is actionable only when 
death occurs, questions the very essence of the right as a human right; it 
becomes more of a posthumous right. Indeed, how did the framers of the 
Constitution intend to guarantee the right to life in Nigeria, when the Con-
stitution would not guarantee the security and welfare of citizens? 
In order to fully appreciate the argument for an inclusive application 
of the right to life, it is worth considering the following questions: how can 
a dignified life be achieved without an enforceable duty on government to 
“provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods 
and services throughout the Federation”? Of what essence is the bare “right 
to life” provision, where citizens cannot go to court to challenge the gov-
ernment on the general state of insecurity, bad roads, poor health services 
and a general dearth of basic services in the country? Does the mere absence 
of these basics not threaten the life of citizens and limit their freedom and 
happiness? The answer to these questions invariably confirms rather than 
rebuff the inclusive application of the constitutional text of the right to life. 
33 General Comment 3, The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (Article 2 Para 1 of the CE-
SCR (5th Section, 1990), cited in Mubangizi, ibid, p. 4 
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9. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the right to life is a bundle of rights which are available, not only for the prevention of unlawful deprivation of life, 
but also for the sustenance of life. The right to life in section 33 of the CFRN 
arguably encompasses all other rights which appertain to individuals, as 
living beings, and which are essential to maintaining that status of a living 
being. Accordingly, deaths arising from the failure of government to address 
the major causes of avoidable deaths – bad roads and lack of adequate se-
curity – are attributable to the government as a clear breach of section 33. 
Considering the positive trends from other jurisdictions34 in which 
courts have transformed political commitments through the indivisibility 
of human rights into legal, economic and social reality and in view of the 
neutral nature of human rights generally, there is a need for Nigerian Courts 
to follow suit by using the right to life as the tool for promoting good gov-
ernance and for holding government accountable for failure to create a so-
ciety conducive to the sustenance of life.35 Indeed, the duty imposed on the 
government to protect its citizens in line with the social contract doctrine re-
quires government to explore all necessary measures, be it legislative, exec-
utive or judicial, to protect vulnerable groups in the society from all manner 
of interests that can impede or completely annihilate the enjoyment of their 
status as human beings. This is what the Nigerian government must be seen 
to be doing at this time that life expectancy in Nigeria is at its lowest ebb. 
It is also incumbent on lawyers to begin to frame cause of actions both-
ering on the socio-economic aspects of the CFRN in the light of the civil and 
political rights to which they are associated. It is hoped that Nigerian courts 
would support this initiative with the aim of making the safeguards in our 
constitutional bill of rights more effective. For unless, and until, the courts 
lend themselves to the suffering mass of the Nigerian people as the trusted 
tool for social engineering, the tool of criminality, expressed in corruption, 
armed robbery, kidnapping, terrorism and even drunk driving, would con-
tinue to overwhelm law and order in Nigeria.
34 E.g. South Africa, Pakistan, India, etc
35 See Arambulo, K., Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights: Theoretical and Procedural Aspects, (Oxford, Hart Pub-
lishers, 1999) 450-451, (arguing that, the justiciability of socio-economic rights flows from 
the interdependence and indivisible nature of all human rights. With specific reference to 
Nigeria, Kitty argued that the so-called fundamental rights (as contained in chapter IV of 
the Nigerian Constitution), will become meaningless where the socio-economic (and envi-
ronmental) rights of citizens are undermined.
